Sandy City, a municipal corporation v. Salt Lake County, political subdivision of the State of Utah, Salt Lake County planning commission, K. Delyn Yeates, R. Scott Priest, W. Scott Kjar, Steven E. Smoot, Posteroblecker, Inc., and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Sandy City, a municipal corporation v. Salt Lake
County, political subdivision of the State of Utah,
Salt Lake County planning commission, K. Delyn
Yeates, R. Scott Priest, W. Scott Kjar, Steven E.
Smoot, Posteroblecker, Inc., and Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Walter R. Miller; Sandy City Attorney; Attorney for Appellant.
Brinton R. Burbidge; Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell; Leonard J. Lewis; John W. Andrews; Van
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy; Kent S. Lewis; Deputy County Attorney; Attorneys for
Appellees.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, No. 880429 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1232
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KFU 
60 
AW 
DOCK! 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ifelc4_ 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, K. 
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON 
U.S.A. INC., 
Defendants and Respondents, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 880429-CA 
Argument Priority No. 14b 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
On Appeal from the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond Uno presiding. 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
Attorney for Yeates, Priest, Kjar, 
and Smoot 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Kent Lewis 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
2001 South State Street, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Leonard J. Lewis and John W. Andrews 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Chevron USA, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
(801) 566-1561 
F I L E D 
AUG 3 01988 
MaryT Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, K. 
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON 
U.S.A. INC., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 880429-CA 
Argument Priority No. 14b 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
On Appeal from the Third District Court of Salt Lake Covinty, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond Uno presiding. 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell 
Attorney for Yeates, Priest, Kjar, 
and Smoot 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Kent Lewis 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
2001 South State Street, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Leonard J. Lewis and John W. Andrews 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Attorneys for Chevron USA, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
(801) 566-1561 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND ORDINANCES. . . . . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ITS 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTES AND ORDINANCES APPLICABLE TO 
THIS ACTION. SUCH MISINTERPRETATIONS WERE RELIED ON BY THE 
COURT IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CITY. . . 14 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT MISINTERPRETED UTAH STATUTES IN A MANNER 
TO PERMIT DEVELOPMENT IN UNINCORPORATED COUNTY TERRITORY WHEN 
SUCH DEVELOPMENT IS EXPRESSLY FORBIDDEN BY THE STATE 
LEGISLATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
COUNTY ORDINANCES WHICH PROHIBIT DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTY 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS ACTION. 19 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
AND ON EVIDENCE WHICH WAS SUBMITTED IN VIOLATION OF THE 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED THE CITY'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
THEREAFTER RELIED ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE WHICH WAS THE 
SUBJECT OF THAT MOTION AND WHICH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 56(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE . 20 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT OVERRULED OBJECTIONS BY THE CITY AND 
THEREAFTER RELIED ON EVIDENCE WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF THOSE 
OBJECTIONS AND WHICH WAS NOT TIMELY SUBMITTED AS REQUIRED BY 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE RULES OF PRACTICE FOR 
DISTRICT COURTS . 25 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE 
SUBMITTED BY THE CITY WHICH CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE CITY TO CONDUCT 
DISCOVERY AS REQUIRED BY RULE 56(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 27 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO PERMIT THE CITY TO TAKE 
DEPOSITIONS OF DEFENDANTS AND CONDUCT OTHER DISCOVERY AS 
REQUESTED BY THE CITY THROUGH AFFIDAVIT OF ITS COUNSEL UNDER 
AUTHORITY OF RULE 56(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 27 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE BEFORE IT 
WHICH CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SUFFICIENT TO 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CITY 29 
POINT IV 
NUMEROUS PUBLIC POLICY FACTORS MITIGATE IN FAVOR OF REVERSAL 
OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT . . 33 
CONCLUSION 36 
ADDENDUM 38 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Bandy v. Century Equipment, 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984). . . . 35 
Callioux v. Progressive Insurance, 745 P.2d 838 
(Utah App. 1987) 28 
Controlled Receivables v. Harmon, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966). 21 
Doenges v. Salt Lake City, 614 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1980). . . . 15 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977) . . 21 
Freeman v. Centerville City, 600 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1979). . . 36 
Geneva Pipe v. S & H Insurance, 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986). . 29 
Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975) 29 
Horsley v. Anaconda, 427 P.2d 390 (Utah 1967) 21 
Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352 (Utah 1972) . . . 21 
Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1987) . . . . . 28 
Loveland v. Orem City, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 (1987) 35 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 
65 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1987) 35 
Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 
561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977) ~. 28 
Sweetwater Properties v. Alta, 622 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1981). . 15 
Utah Technology Finance v. Wilkinson, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 
15 (1986) 34 
Statutes Cited 
Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code Annotated . . . . . . . .5, 18 
Section 10-2-401, Utah Code Annotated . 14, 33 
Section 10-2-416, Utah Code Annotated .15 
Section 10-2-418, Utah Code Annotated 5, 15 
Section 10-2-515, Utah Code Annotated 14 
Rules Cited 
Rule 3(e), Rules of Practice for the Third District Court . 26 
Rule 6(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . . 25 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 21, 26, 29 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence 23 
Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence 22 
Ordinances Cited 
Section 19.84.030, Salt Lake County Ordinances 7 
Section 19.84.090, Salt Lake County Ordinances 19 
Other Authorities 
Dumonuchel, Dictionary of Development Terminology, 1975 . . 18 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
confers upon this Court appellate jurisdiction from District 
Courts of this state in matters of review of final judgments of 
this nature. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Appeal is taken from the Order and Judgment of 
Dismissal by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
which judgment ended all claims of the City. 
The Order and Judgment of Dismissal was entered on the 8th 
day of April, 1988. Notice of appeal was filed with the 
District Court Clerk on the 5th day of May, 1988. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented for determination in this 
appeal: 
1. Whether the District Court erred as a matter of law in 
its construction of the state statutes and ordinances under 
which development in this action was reviewed. 
2. Whether the District Court erred in relying on 
inadmissible evidence and on evidence which was submitted in 
violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Whether the District Court erred in failing to consider 
evidence submitted by the City which created genuine issues of 
material fact and in refusing to permit the City to conduct 
1 
discovery as required by Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
4. Whether the presence of important public policy factors 
mitigate in favor of reversal on appeal. 
STATUTES, RULES AND ORDINANCES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES 
The following enactments are determinative in this appeal: 
1. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
defines the requirements for summary judgment against a party. 
Addendum 1A. 
2. Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
defines the timing for serving affidavits with motions. 
Addendum IB. Also, Rule 3(e) of the Rules of Practice in the 
Third District Court, which limits the court from receiving 
affidavits not filed according to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Addendum 1C. 
3. Section 10-2-418 of the Utah Code Annotated, which 
restricts approval of "urban development" adjacent to municipal 
boundaries. Addendum ID. Also, Section 10-1-104(11), Utah 
Code Annotated, which defines the term "urban development." 
Addendum IE. 
3. Section 19.84.090 of the Salt Lake County Ordinances, 
which provides that conditional use permits cannot be granted 
unless evidence is presented that the use conforms to the 
intent of the master plan and will be in the public interest. 
Addendum IF. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts as appear unrefuted of record in this action are 
as follows: 
The Parties and their Interests 
1. Sandy City is a Utah municipality created to provide 
urban governmental services essential for sound urban 
development and for the protection of public health, safety and 
welfare in residential, commercial and industrial areas, and in 
areas undergoing development. 
2. Defendants Yeates, Priest, Kjar, Smoot, Postero-
Blecker ("Property Owners"), are property owners and developers 
of a parcel of unincorporated territory ( the "Property") which 
lies within one-half mile of Sandy City limits and within 
territory the City has proposed for municipal expansion in its 
policy declaration. 
3. Defendant Salt Lake County ("County") is a subdivision 
of the state of Utah, organized and functioning under authority 
of Title 17 of the Utah Code, and located in Salt Lake County. 
Defendant County Planning Commission is a commission appointed 
by the County and operating under authority of Chapter 27, 
Title 17, of the Utah Code. 
4. Defendants Chevron and Postero-Blecker are 
Pennsylvania and Arizona corporations, respectively, doing 
business in the state of Utah, 
3 
The Property and Its Authorized Uses 
5. This action involves a single parcel of approximately 
4.18 acres of commercial property ("Property") located on the 
northwest corner of 10600 South and 1300 East, in 
unincorporated Salt Lake County ("County").1 The Property 
immediately abuts the municipal boundaries of Sandy City 
("City"), and is located within an unincorporated "island" 
within the limits of the City. 
6. Since its adoption in 1976, the County Master Plan for 
the area has called for Rural Residential uses on the 
Property.2 Sandy City plans also specify similar such uses.3 
The Property has historically been zoned Residential (R-l-8) 
consistent with both City and County plans. 
7. On August 5, 1987, at the request of the property 
owner, the County amended its zoning to permit commercial 
development (Commercial C-2 and Residential RM/zc)4 on the 
Property. The County master plan was not amended to account 
1
 Salt Lake County Commission minutes, August 5, 1987. 
2
 Little Cottonwood District Development Plan, 1976 
3
 The Cresent Citizens Report also recognizes non-
commercial uses. See County Planning Commission minutes, May 
12, 1987. 
4
 County Commission minutes, August 5, 1987 
4 
for this change. For this and other reasons, the City objected 
to the rezoning.5 
8, The City has adopted an Annexation Policy Declaration 
under authority of state statute.6 The purpose of this Policy 
is to declare the areas which the City is willing to annex. The 
Property is within the area projected for expansion under that 
Policy Declaration. The effect of the Policy Declaration is to 
prohibit County approval of commercial development in excess of 
$750,0007 on the Property, unless the Property Owners have 
first attempted to annex.8 The Property Owners have not 
attempted to annex.9 
The Owners' Development Activities 
9. In 1987, the Property Owners purchased the Property 
with express intention to develop a "commercial subdivision."10 
5
 County Commission minutes, August 5, 1987. On September 
18, 1988, the City also requested that the County reconsider 
its commercial zoning. That request was denied by the County 
Commission on September 18, 1987. County Commission minutes, 
September 30, 1987. 
6
 Verified Complaint, Exhibit "I." 
7
 This amount refers to "cost projections" for "any or all 
phases" of development. Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code 
Annotated (Hereinafter "Utah Code"). 
8
 Section 10-2-418, Utah Code. 
9
 Verified Complaint, para. 33 
10
 County Planning Commission minutes, April 28, 1987, and 
County Commission minutes, August 5, 1987. The owners claim 
that the commercial rezoning occurred prior to their purchase, 
although they have introduced no evidence on this point. There 
is no question, however, that the Owners knew that the 
requested zoning contradicted the County Master Plan of the 
City's objections prior to the rezoning. See Application for 
5 
The evidence is undisputed that the land value alone exceeds 
$850,000.J1 
10. The Owners' development is in fact a multiphased 
"commercial subdivision." It's first phase is a Chevron 
Service Complex and the second phase a McDonalds Restaurant. 
There are also other phases of development on the property, the 
specifics of which have not been disclosed by the Property 
Owners. However, costs of development in all phases will run 
to millions dollars. 
11. There was substantial neighborhood resistance to their 
development.12 The Owners made concessions .to residential 
neighbors in order to minimize opposition. One concession was 
that the Owners would be the sole developers of the project and 
that all construction would proceed as a single development.13 
The owners were successful at overcoming some County and 
community resistance through this and other means. 
12. On August 26, 1987, Defendant Postero-Blecker, on 
behalf of Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a 
Zoning, dated April 9, 1987, and County Commission minutes, of 
August 5, 1987 
11
 Affidavit of Gary Free, MAI Appraisal. 
12
 County Planning Commission minutes, April 28, 1987, and 
May 12, 1987 
13
 County Commission minutes, December 9, 1987 (Testimony 
of Pam Delehanty), p. 1588. This concession was also 
apparently made to satisfy County staff concerns that the 
individual commercial tracts "should be developed as a unit and 
not piecemeal." County Planning Commission minutes, April 28, 
1987. 
6 
Conditional Use Permit for construction on approximately .7 
acres of the Property. Such a permit is required by Salt Lake 
County ordinances for commercial development within this zone. 
Such ordinances require that permit applications be made by the 
"owners" of the Property.14 Neither Postero-Blecker nor 
Chevron was the owner of the property at the time of 
application or consideration by the District Court. 
13. The proposed project was a service station, convenience 
store and car wash. The Postero-Blecker application placed the 
value of the development at $250,000. However, uncontroverted 
evidence before the District Court showed the actual value of 
the .7 acre of land alone, to be $200,000 to $210,000. The 
costs of improvements are an additional $450,000 to $550,000. 
That total cost range of $650,000 to $760,000, did not include 
land values or improvement costs for the McDonalds Restaurant 
or any other projects on the remaining 3.48 acres of the 
Property. 
14. On about September 30, 1987 (approximately one month 
after the Chevron application), the Property Owners, through 
their agent, filed a second application for a conditional use. 
This application was for a "McDonald's Restaurant" to be 
located on the Property adjacent to and immediately to the 
north of the Chevron Center. McDonalds was not owner of the 
property at the time of their applications or at any time prior 
to initiation of this action. 
14
 Section 19.84.030, Salt Lake County Ordinances., 
7 
15. The application for this second (McDonalds) phase 
specified the value of the project, including land, to be 
$300,000. However, the evidence before the County showed the 
stand alone costs of the second phase to be $900,000 to 
$1,100,000.15 
County Approval of Phases One and Two 
16. On October 13, 1987, the County Planning Commission 
approved the conditional use application for the first 
(Chevron) phase, over objection by the City.16 On October 14, 
1987, Sandy City appealed that decision to the Salt Lake County 
Commission. 
17. On October 21, 1988, the County Commission denied the 
City's request for appeal and upheld the Planning Commission 
decision.17 The County Commission also entered findings of 
fact over written objection by the City. 
18. On October 27, 1987, the County Planning Commission 
approved the use application for the second (McDonalds) phase. 
The City appealed that approval to the County Commission on 
November 4, 1987. On December 9, 1987, the County Commission 
denied the City's appeal and approved the conditional use 
application. 
15
 County Commission minutes, December 9, 1987 
16
 Planning Commission minutes, April 28, 1987 and May 12, 
1987 
17
 County Commission minutes, October 21, 1988 
8 
Disposition in the District Court 
19. On November 6, 1987, Sandy City filed a verified 
complaint in Third District Court to require compliance with 
the foregoing requirements. By letter dated November 19, 1987, 
the City Attorney inquired of counsel for the Owners, of a 
convenient date for deposition of Owner Yeates. Defendant's 
counsel did not respond to that inquiry.18 However, Answers 
to the complaint were filed by the defendants in December 1987 
and January 1988. 
20. Motions for summary judgment were filed by all 
defendants in January, 1988. On January 26, 1988, the City 
responded with its own motion for summary judgment. Motions by 
the City and Chevron were accompanied by affidavits and 
memoranda. The City filed a Motion to Strike certain portions 
of defendant's affidavits and other documents and filed an 
affidavit of counsel evidencing the need for additional 
discovery time.19 
21. On February 5, 1988, the Court heard the motions for 
summary judgment and Motion to Strike. Counter affidavits were 
filed by the City on the day prior to the hearing. In 
addition, during the hearing, Defendant Salt Lake County 
submitted numerous documents to the court, without prior notice 
18
 Affidavit of Walter R. Miller, dated February 4, 1988 
19
 _Id. A copy of the Affidavit of Walter Miller is 
attached as Addendum 2. A copy of the Motion to Strike is 
attached as Addendum 3. 
9 
to the City. The County evidence was received by the Court 
over oral objection by the City and without inquiry as to "good 
cause".20 
22. On February 25, 1988, Salt Lake County filed a Motion 
for Certification of the Record which it had filed with the 
Court at the hearing on summary judgment, together with 
supplemental related documents, which motion was granted 
23. On March 15, 1988, the Court filed a Memorandum 
Decision denying the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Motion to Strike and granting defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment and Salt Lake County's Motion for Certification.21 On 
April 8, 1988, the Court entered its formal Order and Judgment 
of Dismissal, which order forms the basis of this appeal.22 
24. On April 28, 1988, the City filed a Motion for 
Injunction During Pendency of Appeal. The motion was based in 
part on affidavits showing that comprehensive development was 
occurring on the entire Property and that the Property Owners 
had conveyed the property to Chevron and McDonalds after the 
motions for summary judgment had been heard. That motion was 
denied and the affidavits ordered stricken. 
20
 Transcript, pp. 21, 22, 27-29. The Court latter 
ordered the record to be supplemented, certified, and indexed. 
See Order Concerning Certification of Record, filed March 10, 1988 
21
 A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached as 
Addendum 4. 
22
 A copy of the Order is attached as Addendum 5. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should be granted 
with reluctance. For this reason, the decision of a trial 
court to grant summary judgment must be reviewed in a light 
most favorable to the opposing party and should be upheld only 
if it appears that there was no genuine issue of any material 
fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
Summary judgment in this action did not comport with these 
principles. The following errors of law and fact were made by 
the District Court: 
Errors of Law. The trial court first erred as a matter of 
law in interpreting Section 10-2-418 of the Utah Code. That 
section restricts commercial development within one-half mile 
of a city when the cost projections for the development exceed 
$750,000 for any and all phases. 
The Court also erred failing to consider County ordinances 
which restrict unincorporated area development where evidence 
is not presented that the development will benefit the 
community and conform to the intent of the master plan. 
2o Errors of Material Fact. The District Court erred in 
relying on evidence which violated Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. That rule requires that affidavits 
supporting summary judgment be made on personal knowledge and 
set forth facts admissible in evidence. The admission of 
11 
certain evidence also violated Rules 6(d) and Rule 56(c) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring that affidavits 
supporting a motion for summary judgment be submitted with the 
motion and requiring that affidavits opposing a motion be 
submitted before the day of the hearing. 
The City objected, in a Motion to Strike, to numerous 
statements in Chevron's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting memorandum and affidavit. These statements violated 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and several of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The City also objected to numerous documents untimely 
introduced by the County at hearing, without notice to the City 
or showing of good cause. Yet the court overruled the city's 
objections and relied on this evidence in granting the 
defendants' motion, particularly evidence as to the City's 
willingness to annex, the value of the Chevron project, the 
scope of the development, and the projected costs for the 
entire development. 
The District Court further erred in refusing to permit the 
City further discovery as required by Rule 56(f) of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, as requested through a detailed affidavit 
submitted by counsel for the City. 
The Court also erred in failing to consider the following 
evidence which created genuine issues of material fact: 
12 
a) The City presented evidence that it had expressed its 
willingness to annex the property. The court concluded that 
the City had only said it would only "consider" annexation. 
b) The City presented evidence that the value of the 
Chevron project alone could exceed $750,000. The court 
concluded it could not. 
c) The City presented evidence that the Chevron project was 
one phase of a larger development. The court said that the 
application of Chevron must be considered a single 
development. 
d) The City presented evidence of that the projected cost 
for the Chevron and McDonalds projects alone would exceed 
$750,000, not including land. The court concluded that even 
the costs of Chevron and McDonalds combined could not exceed 
$750,000. 
e) The City presented evidence that the County violated its 
master plan and ordinances in zoning and granting the 
Defendants' conditional use permit for the Chevron property. 
The court found that the County acted properly. 
Because of the foregoing errors of law and material fact, 
and based on sound public policy factors, the decision of the 
District Court should be reversed. 
13 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN ITS 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTES AND ORDINANCES APPLICABLE TO 
THIS ACTION. SUCH MISINTERPRETATIONS WERE RELIED ON BY THE 
COURT IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CITY. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT MISINTERPRETED UTAH STATUTES IN A MANNER 
TO PERMIT DEVELOPMENT IN UNINCORPORATED COUNTY TERRITORY WHEN 
SUCH DEVELOPMENT IS EXPRESSLY FORBIDDEN BY THE STATE 
LEGISLATURE. 
Utah cities are created to provide urban governmental 
services essential for sound urban development and for the 
protection of the public in developed areas and those 
undergoing development. The principle means by which cities 
extend their services to developing areas is through extension 
of their boundaries.23 
The state legislature has determined that city boundaries 
should be extended, in accordance with statutory standards, to 
include all areas of the state where a high quality of urban 
services is needed and can be provided. Annexations also serve 
the legislative purpose of avoiding double taxation by counties 
of city residents and discouraging the proliferation of service 
districts.2 4 
Utah statutes set the conditions for municipal annexation of 
unincorporated territory.25 A City must have adopted an 
23
 Section 10-2-401, Utah Code 
24
 Id. 
25
 Section 10-2-515, Utah Code. 
14 
annexation policy declaration, the territory must conform to 
state standards for annexation, and the annexation must meet 
the standards set forth in the city's annexation declaration.26 
Utah statutes also permit owners of land in unincorporated 
areas to petition cities for annexation of their property.27 
One legislative means of promoting annexation is to restrict 
development along the unincorporated fringes of cities. The 
legislature has strictly limited County approval of urban 
development within one-half mile of a city in unincorporated 
territory which the city has proposed for annexation in its 
policy declaration. Section 10-2-418, Utah Code Ann., 
specifically provides as follows: 
Urban development shall not be approved or permitted 
within one-half mile of a municipality in the 
unincorporated territory which the municipality has 
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy 
declaration, if the municipality is willing to annex 
the territory proposed for such development under the 
standards and requirements set forth in this chapter; 
provided, however, that a property owner desiring to 
develop or improve property within the said one-half 
mile area may notify the municipality in writing of 
said desire and identify with particularity all legal 
and factual barriers preventing an annexation to the 
municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months from 
the filing with the municipality of said notice and 
after a good faith and diligent effort by said property 
owner to annex, said property owner may develop as 
otherwise permitted by law. [Emphasis added] 
Thus, the above statute restricts unincorporated "urban 
development" within one-half mile of Sandy City, if 1) the City 
26
 Sweetwater Properties v. Alta, 622 P.2d 1178 (Utah 
1981); also Doenges v. Salt Lake City, 614 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1980) 
27
 Section 10-2-416, Utah Code. 
15 
has proposed the area for expansion in its policy declaration, 
and 2) Sandy is willing to annex the territory. 
It is undisputed that the Property in this action is within 
one-half mile of Sandy and that Sandy has proposed the area for 
expansion in its policy declaration,,28 The Court, 
nevertheless, erroneously concluded that the Property could be 
developed without annexing. The following factors formed the 
basis of that decision: 
1. "Willingness" of City to Annex. The District Court 
first ruled that Sandy had never publicly declared that it 
would annex the Property: 
Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex the 
subject property, but only that it will consider 
annexation. It was not until the present lawsuit was 
filed that it indicated that it would annex the subject 
property.2 9 
The City had expressly declared its willingness to annex the 
Property before initiation of the lawsuit. Evidence of that 
fact was squarely before the Court. Sandy's Policy Declaration 
identifies by map the unincorporated island in which the 
Property is situated and declares "Islands to be annexed if 
petitioned."30 Counsel for the City had also expressed the 
City's "willingness" to annex directly to the County Planning 
Commission.3 x 
28
 Annexation Policy Declaration 
29
 Memorandum Decision, p.2 
30
 Verified Complaint, Exhibit "I" 
31
 Planning Commission minutes, September 22, 1987 
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But the court's error was not just a factual one. It also 
misinterpreted the statute. It assumed that "willingness" to 
annex must be officially declared in advance of annexation. 
A city must be willing to annex in order for the development 
restrictions to apply. But the statute does not require the 
City to declare such, outside of its Policy Declaration. In 
fact, the statute does not require "willingness" to be declared 
at all. The pretense that "willingness" must be "declared" is 
a fiction of convenience, manufactured by counsel for 
defendants. For this reason, the District Court erred as a 
matter of law in concluding that a declaration of willingness 
must be made. That error requires reversal on appeal. 
2. Definition of "Urban Development." The District Court 
also concluded that annexation was not required because the 
Property was not "urban development." The terms "urban" and 
"development" are in common usage. Fortunately, "urban 
development" is also defined in statute. Section 10-1-104(11), 
Utah Code Ann. (1953), defines the term as follows: 
"a housing subdivision involving more than 15 
residential units with an average of less than one acre 
per residential unit or a commercial or industrial 
development for which cost projections exceed $750,000 
for any or all phases." [Emphasis added] 
The District Court erred twice in its conclusion that the 
project was not urban development. First, the Court assumed 
that the value of building fixtures should not be considered in 
determining cost projections. However, cost projections for a 
development include all costs from land acquisition to the 
17 
finished project. In fact, "development" includes "any or all 
undertakings necessary for planning, land acquisition, 
demolition, construction, or equipment of a project."32 
Second, the court erroneously assumed that each pad within a 
project constitutes a separate development. The facts before 
the court were that the entire 4.18 acres were under single 
ownership and that the entire tract, including Chevron and 
McDonalds^ was a single "commercial subdivision." Yet in 
determining whether the defendants' development was "urban 
development," the court said that "the application of Chevron 
should be considered a single development."33 
This interpretation is directly opposed to and defeats the 
purpose of Section 10-2-418. The definition of urban 
development emphasizes that cost projections must include "any 
or all phases."34 
In including "all phases" in the definition, the legislature 
wisely anticipated the kind of development being considered in 
this case—one which is developed in multiple phases. This 
language is designed to prevent a developer, as in this case, 
from circumventing the development statute by simply segmenting 
or timing his projects. 
The Court erred in considering only the first phase in 
32
 Dumonuchel Dictionary of Development Terminology, 1975 
33
 Memorandum Decision, p. 2 
34
 Section 10-1-104(11), Utah Code. 
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calculating total development costs. That error requires 
reversal as a matter of law. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
COUNTY ORDINANCES WHICH PROHIBIT DEVELOPMENT IN THE COUNTY 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS ACTION. 
Salt Lake County has adopted specific standards for granting 
a conditional use permit: 
The planning commission shall not authorize a 
conditional use permit unless the evidence presented is 
such as to establish: 
A. That the proposed use at the particular location 
is necessary or desirable to provide a service or 
facility which will contribute to the general well-
being of the neighborhood and the community; and 
B. That such use will not, under the circumstances 
of the particular case, be detrimental to the health, 
safety or general welfare of persons residing or 
working in the vicinity, or injurious to property or 
improvements in the vicinity; and 
C. That the proposed use will comply with the 
regulations and conditions specified in this title for 
such use; and 
D. That the proposed use will conform to the intent 
of the county master plan.35 
This ordinance states clearly that not only must each of the 
standards for conditional use be met, but evidence must be 
presented to show compliance. An examination of the minutes 
for the meetings at which the conditional use permit for 
Chevron was discussed reveals that evidence was not introduced 
to show the compliance of the Chevron phase. 
No evidence was presented to show that a gasoline station at 
on the subject property was consistent with the County's master 
plan. In fact, no such evidence could have been presented 
because the proposed use is inconsistent with that plan. 
35
 Section 19.84.090, Salt Lake County Ordinances 
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No evidence was presented to show that the proposed use 
would benefit the community. A general assertion was made by 
Chevron's attorney that Chevron wanted the station.36 Several 
citizens also said they favored the project.37 But the only 
specific testimony was that adverse community impact would 
result.3 8 
The District Court seemed to understand that findings of 
community benefit were required under County ordinance.39 
However, the Court erred, as a matter of law, in concluding 
that a finding of community benefit and conformity to the 
master plan could be made under County ordinances, in the 
absence of evidence and in the face of specific contradictory 
testimony. Such error is sufficient to justify reversal on 
appeal. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
AND ON EVIDENCE WHICH WAS SUBMITTED IN VIOLATION OF THE 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT DENIED THE CITY'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND 
THEREAFTER RELIED ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE WHICH WAS THE 
SUBJECT OF THAT MOTION AND WHICH FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 56(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
36
 Planning Commission minutes, October 13, 1987 
37
 Planning Commission minutes, September 22, 1987 and 
October 13, 1987 
38
 Planning Commission minutes, September 22, 1987 
(Testimony of Kent Davis) 
39
 Memorandum Decision, p. 2, para 2 
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Summary Judgment is a harsh remedy.40 Appropriately, 
evidence submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment 
must meet strict standards. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure defines those standards as follows: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively 
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The 
court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or 
opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 
further affidavits.41 [Emphasis added] 
Evidence which does not meet the foregoing standards is 
subject to a motion to strike.42 The Defendants submitted with 
their motion for summary judgment an affidavit and a memorandum 
which failed to conform to Rule 56(e). Accordingly, the City 
filed a Motion to Strike. The District Court denied that 
motion, and thereafter relied on critical evidence, subject of 
the motion, which failed to comply with the requirements of 
Rule 56(e) . 
The following are examples of evidentiary errors by the 
Court: 
1. Evidence of City "willingness" to Annex. The District 
Court relied on inadmissible assertions in concluding that the 
40
 Horsley v. Anaconda, 427 P.2d 390 (Utah 1967); 
Controlled Receivables v. Harmon, 413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966). 
41
 See also Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 
1977) 
42
 Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1972) 
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City had "not clearly stated it would annex the subject 
property".43 Chevron's Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment asserts: "While the subject property lies 
within Sandy City's policy declaration, Sandy City did not 
express its willingness to annex the property as required by 
statute."44 
In fact, Chevron provided no evidentiary support for this 
assertion. Nor was there any other evidence before the Court 
to support this conclusion. The Chevron allegation was made 
without knowledge, oath, or foundation.45 It also constitutes 
hearsay.46 Such deficiencies formed the basis of the City's 
Motion to Strike. 
2. Evidence as to value of the Chevron project. The 
District Court reached the following surprising conclusion as 
to the value of the Chevron project: 
"The value of the fixtures and personal property should 
not be considered. The projected cost of the proposed 
service station project is under $750,000."47 
The Court apparently relied on Chevron's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment for this conclusion. 
That memorandum states: 
43
 Memorandum Decision, pe 2 
44
 Memorandum, pp. 14-15 
45
 Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
46
 Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
47
 Memorandum Decision, p. 2 
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Evidence before the Planning Commission also showed the 
projected total cost of Chevron's proposed service 
station, for which the conditional use permit was 
granted, to be approximately $175,000, exclusive of 
personal property. The land value of the Chevron 
parcel is estimated at $200,000.48 
In support of this assertion, the Chevron referred to the 
Affidavit of Helen Christiansen, Exhibits A-C, which consists 
of minutes from County meetings. The minute entry contains 
Chevron's representation to the County Planning Commission of 
the value of the project. There was no foundation for the 
expertise on which the cost estimate was based.49 The 
representation was hearsay and was stated without oath or 
knowledge. 
The City moved to strike these unsupported assertions by 
Chevron's counsel. Denial of that motion and the subsequent 
reliance on those assertions by the District Court, constitute 
reversible error. 
3. Evidence as to Full Scope of Development. The District 
Court also erroneously concluded: 
"Furthermore, the application of Chevron should be 
considered a single development." 
The District Court again relied upon Chevron's Memorandum 
for its conclusion. That Memorandum asserts: "More 
importantly, the Chevron parcel will be separately owned and 
48
 Chevron Memorandum, p. 5, para. 7 
49
 Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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developed; the current proposal is not part of a common 
development."5 ° 
Again, Chevron's counsel cites no support for this 
assertion. It was made without knowledge, oath, or foundation, 
and is hearsay. It also directly contradicts verified 
evidence, discussed in Point III below, which demonstrated that 
the Property was being developed as a whole, and not piecemeal. 
The Court's reliance on counsel's unsupported conclusions in 
the face of contradictory evidence constitutes further error 
and requires reversal. 
4. Evidence of Projected Costs for Entire Development. 
The District Court concluded as follows concerning the 
projected costs for the entire development: 
"Even if Chevron's application were not considered a 
single development, and were combined with McDonald's 
project, the project will still not exceed $750,000.00." 
The "McDonald's project," referred to by the Court, is the 
second phase of development on the Property. McDonalds' 1.3 
acres, combined with the .7 acres of the Chevron project, 
constitutes less than one-half of the entire development. Yet 
the Court, impliedly assumes, contrary to the evidence, that 
only those two phases should be considered in determining 
"projected costs" for the entire development. 
The court again erred in concluding that projected costs for 
Chevron and McDonalds combined would not exceed $750,000. 
There was no statement, sworn or otherwise, before the Court to 
50
 Chevron Memorandum, p. 18 
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verify that conclusion. As will be discussed in Point III 
below, that conclusion was also directly contrary to sworn 
expert testimony which was before the Court. 
The foregoing are only examples. Yet, they demonstrate a 
repeated reliance by the Court on unfounded speculation -- mere 
fictional assertions -- which, when accepted by the Court, came 
to form the basis of its decision. Such reliance directly 
violates both the rules of evidence and of civil procedure. In 
the face of such error, reversal should be ordered on appeal. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT OVERRULED OBJECTIONS BY THE CITY AND 
THEREAFTER RELIED ON EVIDENCE WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF THOSE 
OBJECTIONS AND WHICH WAS NOT TIMELY SUBMITTED AS REQUIRED BY 
THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE RULES OF PRACTICE FOR 
DISTRICT COURT. 
The District Court accepted and relied on evidence not 
timely before it in making its determinations against the City. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure specify the timeliness standard. 
Affidavits supporting a motion for summary judgment must be 
submitted at the time the moving party files the motion. Rule 
6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(d) A written motion, other than one which may be 
heard exparte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall 
be served not later than 5 days before the time 
specified for the hearing, unless a different period is 
fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an 
order may for cause shown be made on ex parte 
application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, 
the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, 
except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing 
affidavits may be served not later than 1 day before 
the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served 
at some other time. [Emphasis added] 
This rule is particularly important, as in this case, when 
parties are submitting affidavits and other evidence on cross 
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motions for summary judgment. The trial court must be careful 
not consider affidavits submitted in opposition to one motion 
for summary judgment in granting a motion for summary judgment 
by another party. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
motions for summary judgment to be filed "at least 10 days 
before the time fixed for the hearing." Opposing affidavits 
may be served at any time "prior to the day of the hearing." 
Affidavits not filed within the time required by these rules 
may not be received by the Court, except on stipulation of the 
parties or for good cause shown.51 
These rules demonstrate the intent behind requiring a party 
to submit supporting affidavits with its motion. It is to 
allow the adverse party an opportunity to respond with opposing 
affidavits. If a trial court considers affidavits submitted in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment in granting the 
same party's motion for summary judgment, it renders verified 
response by opposing counsel impossible. 
The County submitted numerous documents at the hectring 
without stipulation, good cause, or even any notice to the 
city. The City objected to the introduction of these 
documents,52 But the court allowed the documents into evidence 
and relied on them in granting the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. 
51
 Rule 3(e), Rules of Practice in the Third District Court 
52
 Transcript, pp. 25-29 
26 
The Court's reliance is evident in its Memorandum Decision. 
For instance, the Court concluded that the first (Chevron) 
phase was a single development. It also ruled that the Chevron 
and McDonald's phases combined would not exceed $750,000. 
The Defendants introduced no evidence with their motions for 
summary judgment which showed that the Chevron project 
constituted a single development. Yet, the Court concluded 
that the Chevron project was a single development. 
No evidence was submitted with Defendants' motions on the 
value of the McDonald's project or of the entire development. 
Yet the Court concluded that the entire costs would not exceed 
$750,000. 
The Court could not have reached these conclusions from 
evidence submitted ten days prior to hearing as required by the 
Rules of Procedure. Its ruling was, accordingly, improper and 
requires reversal. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE 
SUBMITTED BY THE CITY WHICH CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT AND IN REFUSING TO PERMIT THE CITY TO CONDUCT 
DISCOVERY AS REQUIRED BY RULE 56(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO PERMIT THE CITY TO TAKE 
DEPOSITIONS OF DEFENDANTS AND CONDUCT OTHER DISCOVERY AS 
REQUESTED BY THE CITY THROUGH AFFIDAVIT OF ITS COUNSEL UNDER 
AUTHORITY OF RULE 56(f) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
A motion for summary judgment should not be granted when the 
nonmoving party has not completed discovery because further 
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discovery may create genuine issues of material facts 
sufficient to defeat the motion.53 
The party opposing summary judgment must file an affidavit 
evidencing the need for further discovery.54 The City filed 
the affidavit of its counsel with the trial court previous to 
the hearing on the motions for summary judgment. The affidavit 
stated, among other things, that the City was unable, after 
request, to take the deposition of the defendants and was 
unable^ after repeated efforts, to obtain a certified copy of 
certain County Commission minutes. The affidavit stated 
further what issues of material fact the City expected to 
discover. 
The efforts described in the affidavit represent only the 
beginning of discovery. Focus is required for inquiry into 
Chevron and McDonalds, both among the largest of world 
corporations. The City hoped to narrow the burden and scope of 
discovery by first obtaining its own appraisal and then 
deposing the local Property Owners. 
The trial court erred in refusing to permit the steps of 
discovery to commence. The granting of summary judgment 
against the City, in view of counsel's affidavit that 
information remained undiscovered, constituted error sufficient 
to justify reversal of the trial court's ruling. 
5 3
 Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 
561 P* 2d 191 (Utah 1977); Callioux v. Progressive Insurance, 
745 P. 2d 838 (Utah App. 1987). 
54
 Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P. 2d 1196 (Utah 1987). 
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B. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE BEFORE IT 
WHICH CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SUFFICIENT TO 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE CITY, 
Summary judgment should be entered only when "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."55 "It takes 
only one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on 
the other side of the controversy and create an issue of 
fact."56 
On reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment, 
an appellate court must review the record in a light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion was grantedc57 
Application of these rules should have prevented summary 
judgment against the City. The following examples are 
illustrative: 
1. Evidence of City "Willingness" to Annex. 
As discussed previously, urban development is prohibited 
within one-half mile of a city when, among other things, the 
city is willing to annex the property and when cost projections 
for the project exceed $750,000 for any and all phases. Facts 
were before the District Court sufficient to create issues of 
material facts as to these elements. 
55
 Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
56
 Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) 
57
 Geneva Pipe v. S & H Insurance, 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986) 
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The District Court stated in its Memorandum Decision that 
"Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex the subject 
property, but only that it will consider annexation." In 
forming this conclusion, the Court ignored the City's express 
declaration of its willingness to annex the Property in its 
Annexation Policy Declaration., The Court also ignored that 
fact that the City's attorney had further expressly declared 
City willingness before the County Planning Commission.58 
2. Evidence as to Value of the Chevron Project. 
The District Court also ignored facts which create issues as 
to the value and scope of the defendants' development. 
The court concluded that "the projected cost of the proposed 
service station project is under $750,000„"59 Contrary to this 
conclusion, the City introduced a certified MAI appraisal 
showing that cost of the Chevron phase, including land, site 
and building improvements, tenant finish, fixtures and 
equipment, was between $660,000 and $760,000. 
Plainly, there was an issue of fact as to the value of the 
Chevron phase of development. 
3. Evidence as to Full Scope of Development. 
The District Court concluded further that "the application 
of Chevron should be considered a single development."60 This 
58
 Salt Lake County Planning Commission Minutes, September 
22, 1987 
59
 Memorandum Decision, p. 2 
60
 Memorandum Decision, p. 2 
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conclusion is contrary to evidence that the Chevron station is 
part of a larger scheme of development. 
The total development is 4.18 acres in size. The Chevron 
phase is approximately 1/6 of that acreage. The Property 
Owners represented to the County that the property will be a 
"commercial subdivision."61 They also represented to 
neighboring residents that they would be the sole developers of 
the entire tract.62 Such representations create material 
issues of fact which preclude summary judgment and require 
reversal on appeal. 
4. Evidence of Projected Costs for Entire Development. 
There was evidence sufficient to raise a material issue of fact 
as to the costs of the entire development. The cost 
projections for the first two (Chevron and McDonalds) phases 
alone, not including land, exceed $750,000.63 The County's own 
Director of Development Services estimated the cost for 
development would exceed $750,000 and expressed concern about 
cutting up tracts of land to avoid annexation.64 
The Court erred by concluding, in the face of such evidence, 
that the total costs of development would be less than 
$750,000. 
61
 Planning Commission minutes, April 28, 1987 
62
 County Commission minutes, December 95 1987 (testimony 
of Pam Delehanty), p. 1588 
63
 Affidavit of Gary Free, MAI 
64
 Salt Lake County Planning Commission Minutes, September 
22, 1987 
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5. Evidence as to Compliance with County Master Plan and 
County Ordinances. 
There was evidence sufficient to raise issues of material 
facts as to whether the County acted arbitrarily when it 
approved the zoning and conditional use permit for the 
construction of the Chevron station. In approving the 
conditional use permit, the County Commission found, among 
other things, that 1) the development was consistent with the 
County Master Plan which places commercial development at 
intersections, 2) the gas station was desirable for the area, 
and 3) the gas station would not be detrimental to the health, 
safety, and welfare of the community. 
The County could not have properly concluded that the 
proposed development was consistent with the County's Master 
Plan. The present Master Plan calls for rural uses at the site 
of the subject property. This fact alone should preclude the 
granting of summary judgment. The Commission stated in its 
Findings that the Master Plan was outdated. But how else can 
an applicant show that a use conforms with the intent of the 
master plan, as required by County Ordinance, then through the 
most current plan? 
Neither could the County have properly concluded that the 
gas station was necessary or desirable or that it would not be 
detrimental to the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community. Neither the applicant nor the County presented any 
evidence to show that the gas station was necessary or 
desirable or that the gas station would not create hazards. 
32 
Contrary to this lack of evidence, specific testimony was 
given before the Planning Commission that the proposed 
development would create traffic hazards and planning problems 
in the area.65 The Court erred in failing to consider this 
evidence which created these genuine issues of material fact. 
Such error requires reversal on appeal. 
Point IV 
NUMEROUS PUBLIC POLICY FACTORS MITIGATE IN FAVOR OF REVERSAL 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT. 
The following are among the numerous public policy factors 
which each mitigate in favor of summary judgment for the City: 
1. Respect of Legislative Prerogatives. The Utah 
Legislature has expressed its desire to strictly limit urban 
development in unincorporated areas surrounding cities. The 
reasons for these restrictions are express and sound. They 
include the fact that (1) cities are created to provide the 
high quality of urban governmental services needed for sound 
development66 -- counties are not; (2) development within the 
unincorporated areas of the county is a cause of "double 
taxation" of city residents, an "inequity" which the 
Legislature is attempting to eliminate;67 and (3) because 
counties are not empowered to provide full urban services, 
unincorporated development encourages the "proliferation of 
65
 Planning Commission minutes, September 22, 1987 
(Testimony of Kent Davis, Michael Coulam, and Michael Tingey) 
66
 10-2-401(3), Utah Code. 
67
 IcL 
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special service districts," which activity the Legislature is 
likewise attempting to discourage.68 
Because county governments are generally less able to 
regulate urban development, developers have commonly sought to 
develop in unincorporated areas, thus avoiding more 
comprehensive review of their projects. Salt Lake County has 
encouraged such developments because development enlarges 
county tax base, patronage, and political influence. However, 
such activities are directly contrary to the legislative policy 
expressed in the statutes discussed above. 
Due respect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaking 
requires that the judiciary support enactments of the 
Legislature where disagreement is founded only in policy 
considerations and the legislative scheme employs reasonable 
means to effectuate a legitimate objective.69 Respect for 
legislative intentions mitigates in favor of a ruling requiring 
the developers and county to comply with the urban development 
restrictions of state statute. 
2. Balancing of Interests. Defendants' development does 
not just bring into conflict the interests of Salt Lake County 
and Sandy City. Their development is posed directly adjacent 
to residential neighborhoods where residents and property 
owners have met and expressed strong views both for and against 
68
 Id. 
69
 Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 39 Utah 
Advance Reports 15, 19 (1986) 
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the development. Further, the property abuts two major 
arterial streets, and thus poses potential traffic problems for 
both Sandy City and Salt Lake County, 
Orderly administrative procedures, whose proper purpose is 
the final settlement of controversies, is favored by the 
courts.70 State statute provides a process whereby such 
disputes may be resolved -- it begins with the annexation 
process. Through that process, public hearings are held, 
citizens are heard, service delivery efficiencies can be 
maximized, and competing interests can be accommodated. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that city government is an 
appropriate forum for balancing interests and resolving 
disputes between residents and developers.71 This Court should 
likewise give deference to the statutory annexation process in 
order that these policies may be effectuated. 
3. Balance of Powers Principles. The Utah Supreme Court 
has asked trial courts to refer questions, that are properly 
committed to other branches of government, to the appropriate 
administrative process, in order that the powers of other 
branches of government will not be impinged.72 The process 
which has been defined for resolving this dispute is the 
annexation process. 
70
 Bandy v. Century Equipment Co., Inc., 692 P.2d 754 
(Utah 1984) 
71
 Loveland v. Orem City, 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 2, 7 (1987) 
72
 Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 65 Utah 
Advance Reports 8, 11-12 (1987) 
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This Court will promote balance of powers principles by 
requiring defendants' compliance with the annexation process, 
which process is defined and executed through the legislative 
powers of this state.73 
CONCLUSION 
This brief is written, with respect for both the judiciary 
and the district judge who rendered the decision from which 
appeal has been taken. It is unfortunate that a summary 
judgment was rendered in the lower court which contained 
numerous errors of both law and material fact. 
This case will produce a precedent critical to the 
development of this state. This is because the principle means 
by which urban services are extended to developing areas is 
through extension of city boundaries. Large scale urban 
development within unincorporated islands and around City 
fringes, make annexation difficult or impossible. It also 
encourages double taxation and the proliferation of service 
districts, contrary to legislative policy. 
The District Court has ruled in a manner which permits large 
scale development to be approved in unincorporated fringe 
areas, in contradiction to both state statutes and county 
ordinances, without meaningful opportunity for the City to 
respond. Such errors, both of law and material fact, require 
reversal on appeal. 
73
 Freeman v. Centerville City, 600 P.2d 1003, 1004 (Utah 
1979) 
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ADDENDUM 
Addendum 1A 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party* A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Addendum IB 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 6. Time, 
(a) Computation, In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the desig-
nated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or 
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), 
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by 
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued exis-
tence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to 
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending 
before it. 
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion, other than one which 
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not 
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for 
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as other-
wise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some 
other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a pre-
scribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the 
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period. 
Rules of Practice in the Third District Court 
of the State of Utah 
Rule 3, Law and motion calendar. 
Rules 2.7 and 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State 
of Utah shall not apply to motions filed in the Third Judicial District Court. 
(a) All law and motion matters will be heard by the judge assigned to the 
case. These matters will be set on a regular law and motion calendar as 
arranged with the clerk of the judge assigned to the case. Ex parte matters 
based upon stipulation will be presented only to the judge assigned to the 
case. 
(b) Counsel shall contact the court and receive a date for hearing on the 
regular law and motion calendar, or may file a written request that the mat-
ter be resolved without hearing based upon the briefs submitted. 
(c) Orders to show cause and other matters requiring written notice will be 
heard only after written notice, which shall be served not less than five (5) 
days prior to the date specified in the notice for hearing, unless the court for 
good cause shown shall by order shorten the time for notice of hearing. 
(d) Motions based upon depositions or supported thereby shall not be heard 
unless the depositions are filed in the clerk's office at least forty-eight (48) 
hours before the hearing on the said motion. 
(e) Affidavits not filed within the time required by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure shall not be received, except on stipulation of the parties or for good 
cause shown. Courtesy copies of all affidavits shall be given to the judge 
within the time limits required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
shall indicate the date upon which the matter is set for hearing. Such copy 
shall be clearly marked as a courtesy copy, and shall not be filed with the 
clerk of the court 
(f) All motions except uncontested or ex parte matters may be accompanied 
by a brief statement of points and authorities, and any affidavits relied upon 
in support thereof. Points and authorities supporting or opposing a motion 
shall not exceed five (5) pages in length, exclusive of the statement of material 
facts as hereinafter provided, except as waived by order of the court on ex 
parte application. 
(g) The points and authorities in support of a dispositive motion shall begin 
with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which 
the movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences, and shall refer with particularity to those por-
tions of the record upon which the movant relies. 
(h) The points and authorities in opposition to a dispositive motion shall 
begin with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each fact in dispute shall be 
stated in separate numbered sentences, and shall refer j^ith particularity to 
those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies and, if 
applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's 
facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the statement of the 
movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment, 
unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party. 
(i) If a memorandum of points and authorities is filed in support of a motion 
it must be served on the opposing party or his counsel and filed with the court 
no later than ten (10) days before the date set for hearing. If a responsive 
memorandum is filed it shall be served upon the opposing party or counsel no 
later than five (5) days before the date of hearing. 
(j) A courtesy copy of all memoranda of points and authorities filed by 
counsel shall be served upon the judge hearing the matter at least two work-
ing days before the date set for hearing, and shall indicate the date upon 
which the matter is set for hearing. Such copy shall be clearly marked as a 
courtesy copy, and shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(k) The court in civil matters on its motion or at a party's request may 
direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without court appear-
ance. A verbatim record shall be made of all such telephone arguments and 
the rulings thereon if requested by any counsel. 
Addendum ID 
Utah Code Annotated 
10-2-418. Urban development restrictions. 
Urban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile 
of a municipality in the unincorporated territory which the municipality has 
proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if a municipality is 
willing to annex the territory proposed for such development under the stan-
dards and requirements set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that a 
property owner desiring to develop or improve property within the said one-
half mile area may notify the municipality in writing of said desire and iden-
tify with particularity all legal and factual barriers preventing an annexation 
to the municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months from the filing with 
the municipality of said notice and after a good faith and diligent effort by 
said property owner to annex, said property owner may develop as otherwise 
permitted by law. Urban development beyond one-half mile of a municipality 
may be restricted or an impact statement required when agreed to in an 
interlocal agreement, under the provisions of the Interlocal Co-operation Act. 
Utah Code Annotated 
10-1-104. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Municipal" or "municipalities" means any city of the first class, 
city of the second class, city of the third class, or town in the state of Utah, 
but unless the context otherwise provides, the term or terms do not in-
clude counties, school districts, or any other special purpose governments. 
(2) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the 
executive of any municipality. Unless otherwise provided: 
(a) In cities of the first and second class, the governing body is the 
city commission; 
(b) In cities of the third class, the governing body is the city coun-
cil; 
(c) In towns the governing body is the town council. 
(3) "City" shall include cities of the first class, cities of the second class 
or cities of the third class or may refer cumulatively to all such cities. 
(4) "Town" means any town as defined in § 10-2-301. 
(5) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, shall include and apply to 
town clerks. 
(6) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah 
and ordinances, rules and regulations properly adopted by any municipal-
ity unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent of state law. 
(7) "Contiguous" means abutting directly on the existing boundary of 
the annexing municipality. "Directly" includes separation by a street, 
alley, public right-of-way, creek, river or the right-of-way of a railroad or 
other public service corporation, or by lands owned by the municipality, 
by some other political subdivision of the state or by the state. 
(8) "Affected entities" means a county, municipality or other entity 
possessing taxation powers within a county, whose territory, service de-
livery or revenue will be directly and significantly affected by a proposed 
boundary change involving a municipality or other local entity. 
(9) "Peninsula" means an area of unincorporated territory surrounded 
on more than one-half of its boundary distance, but not completely, by 
incorporated territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn 
across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorpo-
rated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total aggre-
gate boundaries of the unincorporated area. 
(10) "Island" means unincorporated territory completely surrounded by 
incorporated area of one or more municipalities. 
(11) "Urban development" means a housing subdivision involving 
more than 15 residential units with an average of less than one acre per 
residential unit or a commercial or industrial development for which cost 
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases. 
Salt Lake County Ordinances 
Chapter 19.84 
CONDITIONAL USES 
Sections: 
19.84.010 
19.84.020 
19.84.030 
19.84.040 
19.84.050 
19.84.060 
19.84.070 
19.84.080 
19.84.090 
19.84.100 
19.84.110 
19.84.120 
19.84.130 
19.84.140 
Purpose. 
Conditional use permit 
required when. 
Application requirements— 
Fee. 
Public hearing. 
Determination of commission. 
Delegation of approval 
authorit}. 
Policies established. 
Re>iew b\ planning 
commission. 
Conditions for approval. 
Appeal of planning director 
decision. 
Appeal of planning commission 
decision. 
Inspection, 
Time limit. 
Sale of alcoholic beverages. 
19.84.010 Purpose. 
The purpose of this chapter is to allow the 
proper integration into the county of uses which 
ma\ be suitable only in certain locations in the 
county or zoning distnct. or only if such uses are 
designed or laid out on the site in a panicular 
manner. (Pnor code § 22-31-1) 
19.84.020 Conditional use permit required 
when. 
A conditional use permit shall be required for 
all uses listed as conditional uses in the distnct 
regulations or elsewhere in this title. A condi-
tional use permit may be revoked upon failure in 
compliance with conditions precedent to the 
onginal approval of the permit. (Pnor code § 
22-3i-2(part)) 
19.84.030 Application requirements—Fee. 
A. Application for a conditional use permit 
shall be made by the property owner or certified 
agent thereof to the planning commission 
B Accompanying Documents. Detailed site 
plans drawn to scale and other drawings neces-
sary to assist the planning commission in arriv-
ing at an appropnate decision. 
C. Fee. The fee for an\ conditional use permit 
shall be as provided for in Section 3 52.040 ot 
this code. (Pnor code $22-31-2(1)—(3)) 
19.84.040 Public hearing. 
No public heanng need be held. however a 
heanng may be held when the planning commis-
sion shall deem such a heanng to be necessary in 
the public interest. 
A. The planning commission may delegate to 
the planning director the holding of the heanng 
B The planning director shall submit to the 
planning commission a record of the heanng. 
together with a report of findings and recommen-
dations relative thereto, for the consideration ot 
the planning commission 
C. Such hearing, if deemed necessary. shall be 
held not more than thirty days trom the date of 
application. The panicular time and place shall 
be established by the planning director 
D The planning director shall publish a 
notice of heanng in a newspaper of general cir-
culation in the county noi less than ten da\ s pnor 
to the date of the heanng. Failure of property 
owners to receive notice of the heanng shall in no 
way affect the validity of action taken. (Prior 
code §22-31-2(4)) 
19.84.050 Determination of commission. 
The planning commission may permit a con-
ditional use to be located within any distnct in 
which the panicular conditional use is permitted 
by the use regulations of this title In authonzinz 
any conditional use the planning commission 
shall impose such requirements and conditions 
as required by law and am additional conditions 
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19.84.050 
as may be necessary for the protection of adja-
cent properties and the public welfare. Such con-
ditions of approval may include but shall not be 
limited to limitations or requirements as to the 
height, size, location and design of structures, 
landscaping, density, ingress-egress, fencing, 
parking or lighting. Height, density and size 
requirements for structures in each zone are 
maximums and may be reduced or modified as 
conditions to the approval of any conditional use 
application. (Ord. of 5/29/85: prior code § 
22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.060 Delegation of approval authority. 
The planning commission may delegate to the 
planning director the authority to approve, mod-
ify or deny all or part of the conditional uses set 
forth in this title. (Prior code § 22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.070 Policies established. 
The planning commission shall establish pol-
icies regarding landscaping, fencing, lighting, 
ingress-egress, height of buildings. etc.. to guide 
the decision of the planning director to ensure 
consistency in the issuance of conditional use 
permits. (Prior code § 22-31-2(5)(pan)) 
19.84.080 Review by planning commission. 
The planning director is authorized to bring 
any conditional use permit application before 
the planning commission if. in his opinion, the 
general public interest will be better served by 
review of the planning commission. (Prior code § 
22-3l-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.090 Conditions for approval. 
The planning commission shall not authorize 
a conditional use permit unless the evidence pre-
sented is such as to establish: 
A. That the proposed use at the particular 
location is necessary or desirable to provide a 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the 
communitv: and 
B. That such use will not. under the circum-
stances of the particular case, be detrimental to 
the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to 
property or improvements in the vicinity: and 
C. That the proposed use will comply with the 
regulations and conditions specified in this title 
for such use: and 
D. That the proposed use will conform to the 
intent of the county master plan. (Prior code >J 
22-31-2(5)(pan)) 
19.84.100 Appeal of planning director 
decision. 
Any person shall have the right to appeal the 
decision of the planning director to the planning 
commission by filing a letter with the planning 
commission within five days of the planning 
director's action, stating the reason for the appeal 
and requesting a hearing before the planning 
commission at the earliest regular meeting of the 
commission. (Prior code § 22-3l-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.110 Appeal of planning commission 
decision. 
A. Any person shall ha\ e the right to appeal to 
the board of county commissioners an\ decision 
rendered by the planning commission b> filing in 
writing, and in triplicate, stating the reasons for 
the appeal .with the board of county commis-
sioners within ten days following the date upon 
which the decision is made by the planning com-
mission. After receiving the appeal the county 
commission may reaffirm the planning commis-
sion decision or set a date for a public hearing. 
B. Notification of Planning Commission. 
The board of county commissioners shall notif> 
the planning commission of the date of the 
review, in writing, at least seven days preceding 
the date set for hearing so that the planning com-
mission may prepare the record for the hearing. 
C. Determination by Board of County Com-
missioners. The board of county commissioners 
after proper review of the decision of the plan-
ning commission may affirm, reverse, alter or 
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remand for further review and consideration any 
action taken by the planning commission. (Prior 
code § 22-3 l-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.120 Inspection. 
Following the issuance of a conditional use 
permit by the planning commission the director 
of building inspection shall approve an applica-
tion for a building permit pursuant to Chapter 
19.94 of this title and shall ensure that develop-
ment is undertaken and completed in com-
pliance with the permits. (Prior code § 
22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.130 Time limit. 
Unless there is a substantial action under a 
conditional use permit within a maximum 
period of one year of its issuance, the conditional 
use permit shall expire. The planning commis-
sion may grant a maximum extension of six 
months under exceptional circumstances. (Prior 
code § 22-31-2(5)(part)) 
19.84.140 Sale of alcoholic beverages. 
A. The planning commission shall authorize 
a conditional use permit to sell alcoholic bev-
erages except Class A beer outlets and Class B 
beer outlets where it is determined by the plan-
ning commission: 
1. That the use is not in the immediate prox-
imity of any school, church, library, public play-
ground, or park: 
2. That the proposed use at a particular loca-
tion is necessary and desirable to provide the 
service or facility which will contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and the 
community; and 
3. That such use will not. under the circum-
stances of the particular case, be detrimental to 
the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to 
property or improvements in the vicinity: and 
4. That the proposed use will comply with 
regulations and conditions specified in this title 
for such use: and 
5. That the proposed use will conform to the 
intent of the county master plan. 
B. All conditional use permits for uses dispen-
sig alcoholic beverages to be consumed on the 
premises are subject to an annual review, and all 
applications for a conditional use permit for con-
sumption ofliquororbeeron the premises must 
be accompanied by a payment of fees as provided 
in Section 3.52.040. The fees are considered rea-
sonable because of the costs of investigation and 
studies necessary for the administration hereof. 
C. The granting of any permit by the planning 
commission to dispense alcoholic beverages is 
subject to review by the county commission. The 
denial of any permit by the planning commission 
to dispense alcoholic beverages is subject to 
review by the district courts. All appeals of plan-
ning commission decisions to the board of coun-
ty commissioners or the district courts must be 
filed with the appropriate body within thirty days 
from the date of the planning commission deci-
sion. (Ord. 804, 1982: prior code § 22-31-4) 
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Addendum 2 
Walter R. Miller, #2268 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 566-1561 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, K. 
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON 
U.S.A. INC., 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
County of Salt Lake) 
WALTER R. MILLER, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. He is the duly appointed City Attorney for Sandy 
City (hereinafter "City") and has held this position since May 
1, 1986. Affiant has practiced as an attorney and a member of 
the Utah State Bar since 1972. Previous to his appointment as 
City Attorney, affiant has served in several public positions 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
WALTER R. MILLER 
Civil No. C87-07304 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
including staff attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Washington, D.C. and Deputy City Attorney (Chief of the Civil 
Division) for Salt Lake City Corporation. 
2. Affiant's duties as City Attorney include 
representation of the City in legal actions against it. In 
this capacity, affiant serves as counsel of record for the City 
in the above-entitled action. 
3. By letter dated November 19, 1987, affiant 
inquired of Defendant's counsel, as to a convenient date for 
Defendant K. Delyn Yeates' deposition. Defendant's counsel did 
not respond to that inquiry. A copy of affiant's letter of 
inquiry is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. Affiant has been informed that some information 
sought by the City in this action will eventually be made a 
public record, which will be available for the City informally 
and outside of regular discovery process. One such document, 
minutes of the County Commission meeting of December 9, 1987, 
contains information as to the scope, costs and impact of 
development of the property, which is critical to the City's 
case. Affiant has twice sought a certified copy of such 
minutes for court purposes but has been informed by the County 
Commission Clerk that the minutes have not yet been approved by 
the County Commission. The clerk informed affiant that the 
minutes are not scheduled for approval until February 8, 1988. 
5. Aside from discovery from other parties, the City 
has initiated study and public review of appropriate 
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development which relate to this action and have invited 
Defendants to participate in this review. Such study and 
review is currently underway but has not yet been completed. 
Affiant believes such study and review will produce 
information vital to prosecution of this action. 
6. Discovery by the City is incomplete in this action 
and affiant is of the opinion, based on information and belief, 
that information sought in discovery will create genuine issues 
of material fact sufficient to defeat Defendants' motions for 
summary judgment, including but not limited to the following: 
a. That zoning and proposed uses for the 
property contradict the County master plan and that 
insufficient evidence was presented to the County Planning 
Commission to demonstrate conformity with that plan, as 
required by County ordinance. 
bo That the proposed zoning and use is 
unnecessary or undesirable or will not contribute to the 
general well-being of the neighborhood and community and that 
evidence concerning such subjects was not appropriately 
presented by Defendants to County officials, as required by 
County ordinance. 
c. That the zoning and proposed uses will be 
detrimental to the health, safety or general welfare of persons 
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious to property 
or improvements in the vicinity, and that evidence of such 
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matters was not appropriately presented to County officials as 
required by ordinance. 
d. That the true scope, costs and impact of 
development, in all phases, for the property, including but not 
limited to land acquisition and improvement, financing, general 
construction, fixturing, development fees and service 
connections, as known to Defendant developers, were not fully 
and accurately communicated to County officials during the 
decision-making process. 
e. That Defendants' "commercial subdivision" was 
not platte.d and approved as required by state statute and that 
all evidence will be consistent in demonstrating that the costs 
of development of that subdivision substantially exceed 
$750,000. 
7. The document attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a 
true and correct copy of objections filed with Salt Lake 
County, by affiant on behalf of the City. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
Walter R. Miller 
City Attorney 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of 
February, 1988. 
Notary Public, Residing in 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
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Addendum 3 
Walter R. Miller, #2268 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Telephone: (801) 566-1561 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal : 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO STRIKE 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, political' 
subdivision of the State of : Civil No. C87-07304 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, K. : 
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, : 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON : Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
U.S.A. INC., 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff Sandy City respectfully moves the Court 
pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for 
an Order striking the affidavit, portions of motion and 
memorandum referred to in this Motion, which affidavit, 
memorandum and motion were submitted by Defendants in support 
of their motions for summary judgment. This motion is based on 
the failure of said documents to conform to the requirements of 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rules 603, 701, 
702, 802 and 805 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, as more fully 
set forth in the attached summary of objections. 
DATED this day of January, 1988. 
Walter R. Miller 
City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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SUMMARY OF OBJECTIONS TO 
DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Document Paragraph Allegation Objection Rule 
otion for Summary Page 2 
idgment - Yeates, Para. 2 
riest, Kjar, & Smoot 
^morandum in Support 
f Chevron's Motion Page 2 
or Summary Judgment Para. 1 
Dates of Rezoning 
and Purchase 
Public Hearings 
No foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C 
County Commission 
Approval 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C 
Page 3 
Para. 1 
Application by 
Defendants 
Legal Description 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C 
702 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C 
Page 3 
Para. 2 
Page 4 
Para. 3 
Efforts by Defendants 
Date of Ord. Publication 
Lack of Objection to 
Rezoning 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C 
Page 4 Postero-Blecker an 
Para. 4 Agent 
Page 4 Purpose of Application 
Para. 4 
Page 4 Public Hearings 
Para. 5 Evidence Considered 
Page 4 Evidence Generally 
Para. 6 
Page 4 Evidence as to Value 
Para. 7 
Page 4 District Plan and 
Para. 8 Related Growth and 
Development 
Page 4 Denial of City ApJpeal 
Para. 10 
Page 7 Notice of Hearing 
Para. 1 Failure to Object 
and 2 
Page 8 
Para. 1 
Compliance with 
Procedures 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Otah 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
702 U.R.E 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
702 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.E. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
702 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
Page 9 
Para. 1 
Evidence before 
Commission 
Page 11 Evidence at Hearing 
Para. 1 Council "Jurisdiction" 
Page 12 History of Plan 
Para. 1 Growth and Change 
Page 14 Approval of Decision 
Para. 1 
Page 14 Willingness to Annex 
Para. 3 Not Expressed 
Cost of Development 
Page 15 Expressions by City 
Para. 2 Concerning Annexation 
Page 16 No Commitment to Annex 
Para. 1 
Page 18 Costs of Project 
Para. 1 
Page 18 
Para. 2 
Future Development 
Not Common Development 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
702 U„R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P. 
Affidavit of Helen 
J. Christiansen 
Page 19 
Para. 2 
Page 20 
Para. 1 
Page 20 
Para. 2 
Jurisdictions of County 
And City 
Expense and Efforts 
"Good Faith" Efforts 
By Chevron 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
No Foundation 
Hearsay 
No Know or Oath 
702 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P, 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P 
701 U.R.E. 
802 U.R.E. 
56(e) U.R.C.P 
This affidavit and attached exhibits are objected to to the extent they 
are used to establish any of the allegations set forth above on the grounds 
specified in this summary. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-7304 
Plaintiffs and defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment 
came before this Court on the 5th day of February, 1988. All 
parties were represented by respective counsel. After argument, 
the Court took the matter under advisement. On the 25th day of 
February, 1988, Salt Lake County^ Motion for Certification of 
Record came before this Court. The matter was taken under 
advisement, subject to plaintiff supplementing the record. After 
reviewing the file, Memoranda, record and arguments, the Court 
finds as follows. 
1. Salt Lake County Commission acted properly in rezoning 
the property in question, and was not in violation of any county 
ordinance or county master plan, and did not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously. Furthermore, Sandy City appears to have waived its 
right to object to rezoning. 
SANDY CITY V. COUNTY PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
2. Salt Lake County Planning Commission and Salt Lake 
County Commission properly issued a conditional use permit for 
development of the subject property. The project, based on the 
facts, is necessary and desirable, and not detrimental to the 
general welfare. Furthermore, the defendant Chevron Incorporated 
acted properly in processing its application through the only 
body with jurisdiction at the time, Salt Lake County. Sandy City 
did not have jurisdiction to accept the application. 
3. Defendants1 actions do not violate Utah Code Ann., 
Section 10-2-418. 
(a) Defendants' development does not constitute "urban 
development" proposed within a restricted, unincorporated area. 
(b) Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex 
the subject property, but only that it will consider annexation. 
It was not until the present lawsuit was filed that it indicated 
that it would annex the subject property. Even if Chevron 
petitioned for annexation and Sandy City annexed, there is no 
assurance Sandy City would approve Chevron's application. 
Furthermore, Chevron is not required to petition Sandy City for 
annexation. 
(c) The value of the fixtures and personal property 
should not be considered. The projected cost of the proposed 
service station project is under $750,000.00. Furthermore, the 
application of Chevron should be considered a single development. 
SANDY CITY V. COUNTY PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(d) Even if Chevron's application were not considered 
a single development, and were combined with McDonald's project, 
the project will still not exceed $750,000.00e 
(e) At this time Chevron has taken all the necessary 
procedures for approval of their application, and is ready to 
proceed with their project. 
4. Based on the facts before the Court, it appears that 
Salt Lake County Commission has conducted a hearing that 
comported with all due process requirements. It appears to have 
acted within the scope of its authority, has conducted hearings, 
and arrived at a decision, and does not appear to have acted in 
excess of its authority, or in a manner so clearly outside reason 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. 
Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 P.2d 
281 (1976). 
5. Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that Sandy 
City's Motion to Strike should be denied, and Sandy City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment should be denied. Furthermore, all of the 
defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake County's 
Motion for Certification should be granted. Counsel for 
defendant Chevron is to prepare an Order for the Court's 
SANDY CITY V. COUNTY PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
signature. Said Order should be approved as to form by all 
parties, . f\ 
i£^ Dated this I ^3 day of March, 1988. 
RAYMC 10ND S . UNO 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Addendum 5 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis, #1947 
John W. Andrews, #4724 
Attorneys for Chevron USA, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State 
of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
PLANNING COMMISSION, K. 
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT 
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR, 
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTERO-
BLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON 
U.S.A., INC., 
Defendants. 
The following matters came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, on Friday, the 5th 
day of February 1988, at 2:00 p.m.: (1) Defendant Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) Defendants Salt 
Lake County and Salt Lake County Planning Commission's Motion 
For Summary Judgment; (3) Defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and 
Yeates' Motion For Summary Judgment; (4) Plaintiff Sandy City's 
FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE 
Salt Lake Cou!-.7 .1 •JM 
J \PR^ 1388 
O x . \ •-• • • ' '. 
V '• -v«- • • • - ^ .' 
br-^-i - - Clef* 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF 
DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C87-7304 
Honorable Raymond Uno 
Motion For Summary Judgment; and (5) Plaintiff Sandy City's 
Motion To Strike. Leonard J, Lewis and John W. Andrews 
appeared on behalf of defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; Kent S. 
Lewis appeared on behalf of defendants Salt Lake County and 
Salt Lake County Planning Commission; Brinton R. Burbidge 
appeared on behalf of defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and 
Yeates; and Walter R. Miller appeared on behalf of plaintiff 
Sandy City. 
The Court having reviewed the record and the memoranda 
and arguments of the parties, and good cause appearing, it is 
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows: 
(1) Plaintiff Sandy City's Motion For Summary 
Judgment and Motion To Strike are denied; 
(2) It appearing that no material issues of fact 
exist, and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment are hereby 
granted. It is hereby ordered that the Verified Complaint of 
Sandy City in this action and all causes of action contained 
therein be stricken, and this action be and hereby is dismissed 
with prejudice. / 
DATED this ^ ~~ day of April, 1988. 
_ ^ ^ BY THE COURT: 
B ^ - W * ^ ^ Qopuiy C 
Raymond S. Uno 
rk D i s t r i c t Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
VAN GOTT, BAGLEY< CORNWALL 
& MCCARTHY 
Leonard J. Lewis, Esq. 
John W. Andrews, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Chevron U.S.A.,Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
1600 
Walter R. Miller, Esq. 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kent S. Lewis, Esq. 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Defendants 
2001 South State Street 
#53600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
n 
Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Smoot, Kjar, Priest and Yeates 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
5747A 
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